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Amenability of Foreign Corporations to
Suit in Louisiana
With the growth of corporate activities outside the state of
incorporation, the Louisiana attorney is having increasingly more
contact with the question of when a non-resident corporate de-
fendant may be subjected to suit in Louisiana courts. At one
time a foreign corporation could not be made amenable to suit in
the state courts.' Economic conditions necessitated a retreat
from that position. Now the legislatures of the various states
have enacted measures allowing suits against foreign corpora-
tions. Such legislative authorizations are not without restraints,
however. Any assumption of jurisdiction over a non-resident is
subject to the jurisdictional requirements of the Federal Consti-
tution.2 It is the purpose of this comment to find out how the
Louisiana statutory provisions as interpreted by our courts com-
pare to the present United States Supreme Court decisions on
the question of amenability of foreign corporations to suit in
state courts.3
treatment or for diagnosis with a view to treatment, and relevant to an
issue of declarant's bodily condition;"
"(13) Business Entries and the Like. Writings offered as memoranda
or records of acts, conditions or events to prove the facts stated therein,
If the judge finds that they were made in the regular course of a business
at or about the time of the act, condition or event recorded, and that the
sources of information from which made and the method and circumstances
of their preparation were such as to indicate their trustworthiness,"
"(26) Reputation in Family Concerning Family History. Evidence of
reputation among members of a family, if the reputation concerns the birth,
marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy, race-ancestry or other fact of the
family history of a member of the family by blood or marriage;"
1. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 588 (U.S. 1839). Early in the
nineteenth century it was thought impossible to acquire jurisdiction in
personam over a foreign corporation. Middlebrooks v. Springfield Fire Ins.
Co., 14 Conn. 301 (1841); HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN
AmERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 77 (1918).
2. U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV, § 1; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
See also STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 69 et seq. (2d ed. 1951).
The scope of this comment is limited to the amenability of foreign cor-
porations to actions in personam. Any property of a foreign corporation may
of course be the object of an action in rem under the doctrine of Pennoyer
v. Neff. The Louisiana Supreme Court has held, however, that if the for-
eign corporation has qualified to do business in Louisiana, its property may
not be proceeded against solely on grounds of non-residence. See Burgin
Bros. and McCane v. Barker Baking Co., 152 La. 1075, 95 So, 227 (1922).
3. For the purposes of this comment a foreign corporation will be con-
sidered as any corporation which has not been chartered in Louisiana.
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The pertinent Louisiana statute grants jurisdiction in suits
against foreign corporations in the following circumstances:
(1) where a foreign corporation has appointed a local agent
to receive service of process. 4
(2) where a foreign corporation is required to have an
agent, but such agent cannot be found or has not been
appointed. 5
(3) where the foreign corporation is not required to ap-
point an agent, but conducts business in Louisiana from
which a cause of actfon arises.6 . - =--.
An analysis of each of these provisions will follow.
Foreign Corporations Which Have Appointed an Agent to Re-
ceive Service of Process
The chapter of the Revised Statutes7 dealing with foreign
corporations provides that all non-resident corporations desiring
to do business in Louisiana shall file with the Secretary of State
"the name of its agent in this state upon whom process may be
served." This is permissible under the holdings of the United
States Supreme Court that a state may validly require corpora-
tions to appoint a local agent and consent to the jurisdiction of
4. LA. R.S. § 13:3471(5)(a),(b) (Supp. 1952).
5. LA. R.S. § 13:3471(5)(c) (Supp. 1952), provides:
"If the corporation, being one required by law to appoint and maintain
an agent for service of process, has failed so to do, or such agent, if ap-
pointed, cannot be found, and the corporation has not established and
maintained an office in the state, the officer charged with the duty of making
the service, after diligent effort, shall make return to the court, stating the
efforts made by him to secure service, and the reasons for his failure so to
do, and thereafter, the judge, or in the event of his absence from the par-
ish, the clerk, shall order service to be made on the Secretary of State .. "
(The remainder of the statute provides procedure for obtaining substituted
service on the Secretary of State.)
6. LA. R.S. § 13:3471(5)(d) (Supp. 1952):
"If the corporation is not one required by law to appoint an agent for
service of process but has engaged in business activities in this state through
acts performed by its employees or agents in this state, service of process
in any proceeding on a cause of action resulting from or relating to such
acts performed in this state or any taxes or other obligations arising there-
from may be made on any employee or agent of the corporation, over eight-
een years old, found in this state, or in the event such employees or agents
are no longer in this state or cannot be found, the officer charged with the
duty of making the service, after diligent effort, shall make return to the
court, stating the efforts made by him to secure service, and the reasons
for his failure so to do, and thereafter, the judge, or in the event of his
absence from the parish, the clerk, shall order service to be made on the
Secretary of State .. " (Italics supplied.) (The rest of the statute provides
the procedure to obtain valid service on the Secretary of State.)
7. LA. R.S. § 12:201 et seq. (1950).
8. LA. R.S. § 12:202(A)(1) (1950).
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a state court as a prerequisite for letting a foreign corporation
do business.9
If the potential corporate defendant has qualified to do busi-
ness under the present Louisiana law obtaining a valid service
of process is relatively simple. A list of all local agents for for-
eign corporations is kept by the Secretary of State.'0 Personal
service on the appointed agent will generally suffice to subject
the defendant to the jurisdiction of state courts." However, cer-
tain problems doarise in this area. For instance, can the agent
be served in a suit based on a foreign cause-of -action not in any
manner connected with busiess transacted in Louisiana? Can
anyone other than the named agent be served?
A problem which has caused considerable difficulty is
whether a foreign corporation is amenable to suit on causes of
action which have no connection with the forum state.12 The
extent of the consent, whether it is limited to service upon suits
arising out of causes of action connected with business done
within the state or whether it includes all causes of action against
the corporation, depends upon the terms of the appointment of
the agent and those of the state statute requiring the consent.'8
The Louisiana courts have clearly held that La. R.S. 12:202
requires the foreign corporation only to consent to jurisdiction
9. Bond, Goodwin and Tucker v. Superior Court, 289 U.S. 361 (1933);
Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue Mining and Milling
Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917); Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100 (1898).
See Cahill, Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations and Individuals Who
Carry on Business Within the Territory, 30 HARV. L. REV. 676, 686 (1917).
For Louisiana cases on this point see State v. Hammond Packing Co.,
110 La. 180, 34 So. 368 (1903); State ex rel. Watkins v. North American Land
and Timber Co., 106 La. 621, 31 So. 172 (1902); State v. Lathrop, 10 La. Ann.
398 (1855); Kendall v. Grand Lodge of the Brotherhood of Railroad Train-
men, 8 La. App. 50 (1927); O'Conner v. Jones, 8 Orl. App. 244 (La. 1911).
10. LA. R.S. § 12:202(A)(2), (3) (1950).
11. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 76 (3d ed. 1949).
12. See STUMBERG, CONFLICT or LAWS 85-86 (2d ed. 1951).
13. In Louisville & N.R.R. v. Chatters, 279 U.S. 320 (1929), the Louisiana
statute had been construed by the state court not to apply to causes of
action arising out of business elsewhere. Adopting this construction, the
Supreme Court upheld the finding of the lower court that jurisdiction
existed in spite of the construction on the ground that the cause of action
arose out of business in the state. In Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French,
18 How. 404 (U.S. 1856), Mr. Justice Curtis allowed jurisdiction based on a
foreign cause of action, finding that the Ohio statute should be so construed.
This case was followed in Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. of Philadelphia
v. Gold Issue Mining and Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917), 26 YALE L.J. 794.
On this point Mr. Justice Holmes stated, "Unless the state law either
expressly or by local construction gives to the appointment a larger scope,
we should not construe it to extend to suits in respect of business transacted
. . . elsewhere .. " Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden Breck Const. Co., 257
U.S. 213, 216 (1921).
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where the cause of action arises out of or is connected to business
done in Louisiana. 4 In the leading case on this point, Staley-
Wynne Oil Corp. v. Loring Oil Co.,15 the Louisiana Supreme
Court relied on the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court. 16 It was thought that these decisions reflected a consti-
tutional limitation on allowing suits against foreign corporations
on foreign causes of action. It is submitted this view might ex-
plain in part Louisiana's early refusal to entertain jurisdiction
in these cases. However, it was made clear by the United States
Supreme Court in a 1952 decision that no such constitutional
limitation exists, and that a state court may either assume or
decline jurisdiction without violating federal due process.",
Therefore, it would seem that no constitutional objections could
be interposed if the legislature saw fit to amend our statutory
provisions so as to authorize suits on foreign causes of action.18
Since domestic corporations may be sued on causes of
action arising elsewhere, and since foreign corporations which
register under Title 12 of the Revised Statutes are granted all
14. The consent statute construed is LA. R.S. § 12:202 (1950), which was
formerly La. Acts 1924, No. 184, p. 286. See Staley-Wynne Oil Corp. v. Loring
Oil Co., 182 La. 1007, 162 So. 756 (1935). See also Sunshine v. Southland
Cotton OilCo., 74 F. Supp. 228 (W.D. La. 1947); United Oil and Natural Gas
Products Corp. v. United Carbon Corp., 171 La. 374, 131 So. 52 (1930). Cf.
Harnischfeger Sale Corp. v. Sternberg Co., 179 La. 317, 154 So. 10 (1934),
where the Louisiana Supreme Court announced as a general rule that
Louisiana would have no jurisdiction over foreign causes of action in suits
against foreign corporations but allowed certain exceptions, viz., the court
allowed property brought into the state encumbered by a lien to be subject
to an in rem action.
15. 182 La. 1007, 162 So. 756 (1935).
16. In Staley-Wynne Oil Corp. v. Loring Oil Co., 182 La. 1007, 1018, 162
So. 756, 759 (1935), the court stated: "'[Elven when present and amenable to
suit it may not, unless it has consented . . ., be sued on transitory causes of
action arising elsewhere which are unconnected with any corporate action
by It within the jurisdiction (Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass'n v. McDonough,
204 U.S. 8. 27 S. Ct. 236, 51 L.Ed. 345; Simon v. Southern Ry. Co., 236 U.S. 115,
35 S.Ct. 255, 59 L.Ed. 492).'" This statement was taken from Louisville &
N.R.R. v. Chatters, 279 U.S. 320, 325 (1929).
Both the Simon and the Old Wayne cases represent the old view of the
United States Supreme Court that you must find express consent before
foreign corporations may be subjected to jurisdiction where the cause of
action Is not connected with the forum state. See 1 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 89.4 (1935); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws 213 et seq. (3d ed. 1949); STUMBRG,
CONFLICT OF LAws 86 (2d ed. 1951).
17. Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), 50
MICH. L. REv. 1381. Here the Supreme Court allowed suit against a foreign
corporation on a foreign cause of action when the corporation had not
consented to the jurisdiction.
18. Although the present consent requirement used by the courts to reach
the result that foreign corporations are not amenable on foreign causes of
action is found in the Louisiana Business Corporations Law, LA. R.S.
§ 12:202 (1950), the suggested change could be accomplished by amending
the service of process provision, LA. R.S. § 13:3471(5) (Supp. 1952), so as to
allow suit on all causes of action.
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of the privileges of domestic corporations,19 only the application
of the doctrine of forum non conveniens would seem to justify
refusing to entertain suits against these foreign corporations. 20
A discussion of the doctrine of forum non conveniens is outside
the scope of this comment.21
The question has arisen in Louisiana as to who is the proper
person to receive service of process for a foreign corporation.
In In re Curtis,22 the court held that under an 1890 statute, a
foreign corporation could be served in the same manner as a
domestic corporation. The court also held that under this statute
service on the president of a foreign corporation who was so-
journing in the state was valid.2 3 By Act 54 of 1904 the 1890 stat-
ute was repealed and it was required that service on foreign
corporations be made on the designated agent, or if he could not
be found, upon the Secretary of State.24 In Jackson v. Waters-
Pierce Oil Co.,25 the Louisiana Supreme Court held that under
the 1904 act service could not be made on the state manager of
a foreign corporation. But the court refused to decide whether
the provisions of Act 54 of 1904, designating persons to be served,
were exclusive or not.
The present provision for service on foreign corporations,
contained in Title 13 of the Revised Statutes, which have regis-
tered to. do business here requires service to be made on the
designated agent, or, if such cannot be found, upon any regu-
larly employed agent or employee over eighteen years old in
19. In Palmer v. Avalon Oil Co., 10 La. App. 512, 515, 120 So. 781, 782
(1929), the court stated: "When a foreign corporation comes to this state to
engage in business, and, as a condition precedent, complies with our laws by
designating a domicile and appointing an agent, it thereafter enjoys all the
privileges and benefits, as well as immunities, of a domestic corporation. In
matters of jurisdiction, such corporations are residents of this state and not
absentees. Therefore, their property need not be attached in order to obtain
jurisdiction."
Therefore, seemingly, a hiatus is presented in our law. If the corporation
has appointed a local agent, if is treated as a domestic corporation and no
non-resident attachment will lie. But while a domestic corporation may be
sued in personam on a foreign cause of action, the foreign corporation is
immune. Anomalously, the property of a foreign corporation in Louisiana
appears to be in ,a safer position than that of a Louisiana corporation.
20. Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
21. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); Koster v. Lumbermen's
Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947). See also Blair, The Doctrine o
Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 COL. L. REv. 1 (1929);
Dainow, The Inappropriate Forum, 29 ILL. L. REV. 867 (1935).
22. 115 La. 918, 40 So. 334 (1905).
23. Gravely v. Southern Ice-Machine Co., 47 La. Ann. 389, 16 So. 866
(1895).
24. La. Acts 1904, No. 54, p. 133, repealing by implication La. Acts 1890,
No. 149, p. 188.
25. 136 La. 764, 67 So. 822 (1915).
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any office which the corporation maintains in this state.26 Al-
though there is no express statement in the jurisprudence that
the present provision is mandatory, the indications are that it
is. In Fullilove v. Central State Bank,27 the Louisiana Supreme
Court held that a valid service of process could not be made on
the general manager of the defendant corporation when desig-
nated agents were present in the state and the sheriff's return
did not show that they could not be found. The same conclusion
was reached in Buckley v. S. Abraham Co.28 In the most recent
case on this point, Martin-Owsley, Inc. v. Philip Freetag, Inc.,29
service on a foreman was found to be invalid. The rest of the
cases seem to be in accord.30 Therefore, it appears that if service
cannot be made on the designated agent, this fact must be shown
in the return and then service can be made on any employee or
agent of the corporation eighteen years old at any established
place of business. The corporate defendant seldom contests the
validity of the citation, however, and it is common practice to
serve any employee in the corporation's office without attempting
to obtain service on the registered agent.
When suing foreign corporations registered to do business
here, the use of non-resident attachment proceedings under
Article 240 of the Code of Practice has been the source of some
difficulty. Burgin Bros. & McCane v. Barker Baking Co.31 set-
tled the point that non-residence could not be the grounds for
attachment proceedings against the property of a foreign cor-
poration which had qualified to do business here and appointed
an agent to receive service of process. If the foreign corporation
has_notjegistered, however, its property is subject to seizure, 82
26. LA. R.S. § 13:3471(5)(a), (b) (Supp. 1952).
27. 160 La. 831, 107 So. 590 (1926).
28. 172 La. 845, 135 So. 606 (1931).
29. 202 La. 554, 12 So.2d 270 (1943).
30. Gresham v. Swift & Co., 29 F. Supp. 824 (W.D. La. 1939); United
States v. Frost Lumber Industries, 3 F. Supp. 1018 (W.D. La. 1932); McGovern
v. United Railway Men's Oil Ass'n, 157 La. 966, 103 So. 280 (1924); Teal v.
Philadelphia & G.S.S. Co., 139 La. 194, 71 So. 364 (1916); Felt and Tarrant
Mfg. Co. v. Sinclair Agency, Inc., 4 La. App. 121 (1926).
Professor Beale states that where a foreign corporation has designated
an agent on whom service of process may be made, in accordance with a
state statute, it has presumably performed the required condition, and will
not be taken to have consented to the service of process in any other
manner. 1 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 91.3 (1935).
31. 152 La. 1075, 95 So. 227 (1922).
32. National Park Bank v. Concordia Land and Timber Co., 154 La. 31,
97 So. 272 (1922); Palmer v. Avalon Oil Co., 10 La. App. 512, 120 So. 781
(1929). In this connection, see Poulan v. Gallagher, 147 So. 723, 724 (La. App.
1933), where the court in speaking of a writ of attachment against a non-
resident said: "The fact alone of personal service would not defeat the
right to the writ. The property of an absentee may be attached even though
[VOL. XIV
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even if it could be classified as a corporation "doing business" in
thestate. The latter situation is treated by the court as involving
an action against an absentee who is actually present in the
state with no known location.33 A special problem arises when
a corporation registered to do business here is sought to be pro-
ceeded against by non-resident attachment on a cause of action
not connected with Louisiana. It is settled that no personal serv-
ice may be obtained in this instance.8 4 In Harnischfeger Sale Cor-
poration v. Sternberg Co.35 the property of a foreign corporation
was made subject to an in rem proceeding where the cause of
action arose outside Louisiana and no personal service could
have been obtained here. In that case the property was subject
to a lien when it was brought into the state. This seems to be
the crucial point in the Harnischfeger case. It would seem doubt-
ful that the court would allow the use of non-resident attach-
ment against the property of a corporation which had registered
to do business here in the usual situations.
Foreign Corporations Required to Appoint an Agent, but Which
Have Not Done So, or Whose Agent Cannot Be Found
In addition to those foreign corporations which have been
licensed to do business here and have appointed agents for re-
ceiving service of process, Louisiana law provides for jurisdiction
over those corporations which are under legal obligation to reg-
ister for doing busines in Louisiana, but have not done so.36
Whether or not a foreign corporation should register to do busi-
ness here is measured by the concept of "doing business."
In practically all jurisdictions the phrase "doing business"
has various uses. It has served not only as the measuring device
the absentee be present in the state and personally served. . . .Palmer v.
Avalon Oil Co. et al., 10 La. App. 512, 120 So. 781; Bryans et al. v. Dunseth
et al., 1 Mart. (N.S.) 412; Rayne v. Taylor and Co., 10 La. Ann. 726; De Poret
v. Gusman, 30 La. Ann. 930; Allison v. Brown, 148 La. 530, 87 So. 262."
33. In Palmer v. Avalon Oil Co., 10 La. App. 512, 515, 120 So. 781, 782
(1929), the court in speaking of a foreign corporation which was doing
business here but had failed to register with the Secretary of State said:
"His debtors were corporations organized in a state other than Louisiana.
They had no legal domicile, no agent, here. They were, therefore, absentees.
By the express terms of article 240 of the Code of Practice, a creditor may
obtain an attachment 'when such debtor resides out of the State,' and in
suits in rem, such as this was, the attachment 'was the very foundation of
the suit and stands in the place of the citation required in ordinary proceed-
ings.' 
"
34. Staley-Wynne Oil Corp. v. Loring Oil Co., 182 La. 1007, 162 So. 756
(1935).
35. 179 La. 317, 154 So. 10 (1934).
36. LA. R.S. § 13:3471(5)(c) (Supp. 1952). See text at note 5 supra.
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for minimum jurisdictional requirements for service of process,8 7
but also to determine jurisdiction to tax8 and to exercise other
forms of legislative control.89 However, no distinction was found
in the treatment of "doing business," whether it be for purposes
of service of process, taxation, or statutory regulation.40
In treating the term "doing business" as used in the Chapter
of the Revised Statutes dealing with foreign corporations, it
should be kept in mind that the term as there used does not nec-
essarily have the same meaning as when it is used by the United
States Supreme Court when interpreting the Due Process Clause
of the Federal Constitution. The Supreme Court has adopted the
term to denote a limitation on the states' right to assert judicial
jurisdiction. 41 In this context "doing business" connotes a mini-
mum contact with the state necessary to justify jurisdiction in
view of the Federal Due Process Clause. The term as used in the
Louisiana law designates those foreign corporations over which
the legislature has chosen to exercise control. Since the legisla-
ture. has not defined the term "doing business,"42 the courts have
established their own criteria.
37. LA. R.S. § 12:202 (1950).
38. See LA. R.S. § 47:601 et seq. (1950).
39. For example, see LA. R.S. § 12:211 (1950), where it is provided that
foreign corporations doing business in Louisiana cannot sue in our courts
unless they have complied with the registration requirements of LA. R.S.
§ 12:201 et seq. (1950).
40. In the following cases foreign corporations were found not to be
doing business in Louisiana so as to subject themselves to statutory regula-
tion. [LA. R.S. § 12:211 (1950)] Hess Warming & Ventilating Co. v. Home
Comforts Corp., 205 La. 1045, 18 So.2d 611 (1944); Graham Mfg. Co. v. Rolland,
191 La. 757, 186 So. 93 (1939); Norm Advertising Inc. v. Parker, 172 So. 586
(La. App. 1937).
In Note, 146 A.L.R. 941, 942 (1943), it Is said that corporations may be
doing business in a state so as to subject them to jurisdiction of state courts
and amenable to service of process therein and yet not be subject to a
statute regulating foreign corporations; the power of a state to subject
foreign corporations to local regulation is more restricted by the commerce
clause of the Federal Constitution than is their power to subject a corpora-
tion to service of process.
41. Suppose, for example, that the, federal due process requirements are
met if a corporation has engaged in certain activities in Louisiana over a
six-month period. Suppose also that a Louisiana statute provides that a
foreign corporation shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of Louisiana
courts unless it has engaged In the same activities for at least one year. The
due process requirement would be met. But meeting that requirement would
not dispose of the question of jurisdiction, since the Louisiana legislature
has further limited the jurisdiction of its courts. Therefore, one of the
important aspects of the comment will be an attempt to find what special
limitations Louisiana has in fact imposed upon the power to sue foreign
corporations, and what relationship, if any, these limitations have to the
rules of constitutional law.
42. In Proctor Trust Co. v. Pope, 12 So.2d 724, 727 (La. App. 1943), the
court said: "No act of the Legislature of this state has attempted to define
or say what acts or course of conduct within the state by a foreign
1954] COMMENTS 633
What Constitutes "Doing Business" in Louisiana. There are
few Louisiana cases discussing whether or n6t an unregistered
foreign corporation is amenable to suit in a state court because it
is "doing business" within the state. However, the term "doing
business" is used to specify not only those foreign corporations
amenable to suit, but also those foreign corporations which must
register to have standing to institute suits in our courts. The term
has been discussed in a number of cases involving the right to
maintain suit in Louisiana courts. Since those corporations re-
quie.dto register prior to instituting suit because they are "doing
business" in the state are also the corporations subject to suit in
Louisiana courts, these cases, dealing with standing to sue, can be
considered valid guides in determining when a corporation is
"doing business" sufficient to be sued. However, even in these
cases no precise definition of "doing business" has been estab-
lished.
In what seems to be the leading case in the question of the
foreign corporations' standing to sue, R. J. Brown Co. v. Gros-
jean,43 the Louisiana Supreme Court stated: "The rule of law is
that, when a foreign corporation transacts a substantial part of
its ordinary business in a state, it is doing, transacting, and carry-
ing on or engaging in business therein."44 The rationale of this
test seems to be that if• a substantial amount of the corporation's
business is conducted within the state, the corporation has suffi-
cient contacts with the state 45 to justify its being made amenable
corporation shall constitute 'doing business' therein. The law-making powers
of other states, so far as our research has extended, have not ventured to
do so. The question has been left to the courts. Each case must necessarily
be determined from its* own facts." This view was again expressed recently
in Lake Superior Piling Co. v. Stevens, 25 So.2d 120 (La. App. 1946).
43. 189 La. 778, 1 _So._631 (1938). The question of doing business arose
in this case under LA. R.-S. - 12:211 (1950), which prohibits foreign corp-
orations doing business in Louisiana from suing in our courts unless it has
been licensed to do business and paid all taxes due.
Subsequently, the court of appeal, in speaking of the rule announced
in the Grosjean case, stated: "Surely the large volume of business tran-
sacted by plaintiff over so many years was a 'substantial part of its ordinary
business' within the purview of this rule." Proctor Trust Co. v. Pope, 12
So.2d 724, 728 (La. App. 1943).
As evidenced by two recent opinions of the courts of appeal, the Loui-
SJ~n&,Qurts donot appeart9bJ~pjac~ord as to the meaning and applicaton
of the "substantial business" test of the Grosjean case. See discussion at
page 634 infria. -
44. 189 La. 778, 783 180 So. 634, 636 (1938).
45. One of the early United States Supreme Court decisions accepting
the presence theory of jurisdiction over foreign corporations was the case
of People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79 (1918), where
in interpreting a Louisiana statute the court said that to subject a foreign
corporation to service of process, it must be doing business of such a nature
and character as to warrant inference that it has subjected itself to local
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to jurisdiction in personam. It -is harder to define "substantial
part" of a corporation's ordinary business than to define "doing
business."
The term "substantial part" is as vague as the term "doing
business," and further the use of this term requires that a new
factor be considered, the total business of the corporation. A
volume of business which might represent a "substantial part" of
a small corporation's business might be but an insignificant part
of the total business of a large corporation. Thus under the "sub-
stantial part" concept two corporations having the same contacts
with the state might not be deemed equally subject to suit in
state courts solely because one corporation conducts a larger
volume. of business outside of the state than does the other. The
uncertainty of the "substantial part of business" test is well il-
lustrated in two recent decisions of the Louisiana courts of appeal
which also deal with standing to sue.46 In both cases the issue was
whether or not the J. R. Watkins Company, a foreign corporation
which maintained no office in Louisiana, had no property in this
state, and hired no agents in this state who could legally bind the
corporation, was "doing business" in Louisiana. The Courts of
Appeal, First and Second Circuits, reached directly opposite
results, yet both cases recognized the rule announced in R. J.
Brown Co. v. Grosjean.47 The Court of Appeal for the Second
Circuit, apparently impressed by the fact that only four percent
of Watkins Company's total business was conducted in Louisiana,
found that the corporation was not doing business in Louisiana
since a substantial amount of the Watkins Company's business
was not conducted here.48 The Court of Appeal, First Circuit,
seemed to base its decision that Watkins was doing business in
Louisiana on the fact that the Watkins Company maintained
complete and systematic control over the activities of their agents
in Louisiana.4 These two irreconcilable decisions cogently dis-
close the inadequacy of the "substantial part of business" test.
Other elements which the courts have considered in deter-
jurisdiction and is, by its duly authorized officers or agents, present within
the state or district.It is submitted that the Louisiana courts in adhering to the substantial
business test might possibly be following the old fiction of corporate presence
which has been repudiated by the United States Supreme Court. See Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington; 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
46. J. R. Watkins Co. v. Goudeau, 63 So.2d 161 (La. App. 1953); J. R.
Watkins Co. v. Sanford, 52 So.2d 325 (La. App. 1951).
47. 189 La. 778, 180 So. 634 (1938).
48. J. R. Watkins Co. v. Goudeau, 63 So.2d 161 (La. App. 1953).
49. J. R. Watkins Co. v. Sanford, 52 So.2d 325 (La. App. 1951).
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mining whether or not the business conducted in Louisiana rep-
resented a substantial part are whether or not it was continuous
in nature, whether or not it was more than mere solicitation, and
whether it was conducted by officers and employees or by agents
in Louisiana. 50 The concept of "doing business" does not or-
dinarily encompass the conclusion of one single business trans-
action in the state or entering into one contract herein.51 However,
it was held in Harnischfeger Sale Corporation v. Sternberg 2 that
if one single contract is of such a nature aid of such duration so
as to require the making of numerous smaller contracts, such as
those for the employment of labor and the repairs of machinery,
the corporation will be considered as "doing business" in Loui-
siana.
, On several occasions Louisiana courts have held that soli-
citation of business is not enough to constitute doing business.53
The mere ownership of property in the state, unaccompanied by
its active use in furtherance of the business for which the corpora-
tion is formed, is insufficient in itself to constitute "doing busi-
ness" in this state.5 4 If, however, as in Proctor Trust Co. v. ,Pope,5
another case dealing with standing to sue, the court finds that the
50. Reynolds Metal Co. v. T. L. James & Co., 69 So.2d 630 (La. App. 1954),
is the most recent case on this subject. See also State v. Best & Co., 194 La.
918, 195 So. 356 (1939); National Pumps Corp. v. Bruning, 1 So.2d 320 (La.
App. 1941); Norm Advertising Inc. v. Parker, 172 So. 586 (La. App..1937);
Schultz v. Long Island Machinery & Equipment Co., 173 So. 569 (La. App.
1937). A general discussion may be found in the following cases: United
Oil and Natural Gas Products Corp. v. United Carbon Co., 171 La. 374, 131
So. 52 (1930); Consolidated Carbon"Co. v. United Carbon Co., 171 La. 389,
131 So. 57 (1930).
51. In Schultz v. Long Island Machinery & Equipment Co., 173 So. 569
(La. App. 1937), suit was brought by a citizen of this state against a New
York corporation on a contract for scrap iron bought by that firm. The
court refused to entertain jurisdiction in the case since the corporation
was not deemed to be, in the legal sense, doing business in this state. The
court said that a continuous course of business, conducted by a foreign
corporation's authorized agents within a state, as distinguished from single
transactions or mere casual, isolated or sporadic transactions, such as
occasional purchases or sales, were necessary in order to constitute doing
business in a state.
52. 179 La. 317, 154 So. 10 (1934).
53. In National Pumps Corp. v. Bruning, 1 So.2d 320 (La. App. 1941), the
court found that the agent of the corporation was nothing more than a
solicitor for orders which would be filled out of the state. Such a trans-
action does not constitute doing business within the state. See also State v.
Read & Nott, 178 La. 530, 152 So. 74 (1934); State v. Best & Co., 194 La. 918,
195 So. 356 (1939); Graham Mfg. Co. v. Rolland, 191 La. 757, 186 So. 93 (1939);
Norm Advertising Inc. v. Parker, 172 So. 586 (La. App. 1937). In all of these
cases the court stressed the fact that the orders were subject to acceptance
or rejection at the home office in another state.
54. Lake Superior Piling Co. v.' Stevens, 25 So.2d 120 (La. App. 1946);
L'Hote & Co. v. Church Extension Society of Methodist Episcopal Church,
3 Orl. App. 305 (La. App. 1906).
55. 12 So.2d 724 (La. App. 1943).
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foreign corporation's course of conduct within the state with
respect to its local investments and property was no different from
that which a Louisiana corporation would have pursued in like
circumstances, and this business extends continuously over a
long period of time, the court will hold that the foreign corpora-
tion is "doing business" within the state.
Foreign Corporations Not Required to Appoint an Agent, but
Which Conduct Business Within the State from Which a
Cause of Action Arises
Prior to 1950 service of process could only be made on the
foreign corporations which were "doing business" in Louisiana in
such a manner so as to require them to register'with the Sec-
retary of State. In 1950 the legislature added a provision to the
service of process law to enable the Louisiana courts to assert
personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations "not. required by
law to appoint an agent for service of process but . .engaged in
business activities in this state. '5 6 The procedure for obtaining
service of process under the 1950 act is the same as in the case
where suit is brought against a foreign corporation "doing busi-
ness" in Louisiana which has not appointed an agent to receive
service of process. In the event that no agent nor employee is
found, service may be made on the Secretary of State.5 7 It would
seem that this act will permit Louisiana to entertain all suits
against foreign corporations on local causes of action permissible
under International Shoe Co. v. Washington,58 and subsequent
developments under this case. As yet, this new provision has not
been the subject of judicial interpretation. Obviously, this is a
very important piece of legislation which will extend the juris-
diction of our courts to new fields of corporate activities.
Since the service of process rules prior to amendment applied
to those corporations required to register under Title 12, Chapter
3 of the Revised Statutes, a finding that the corporation is "doing
-business" sufficient to be sued, could be interpreted to mean that
the corporation is subject to legislative jurisdiction and taxation.
The courts, when interpreting the phrase "doing business," are
56. La. Acts 1950, No. 21, p. 28, amending LA. R.S. § 13:3471(5) (1950).
57. For the text of the statute, see note 6 supra. The method of
substituted service on the Secretary of State provides the defendant adequate
constitutional protections of notice and opportunity to be heard. See Du
Bell v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 211 La. 167, 29 So.2d 709 (1947); 1
BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 89.3 (1935); STUMBERO, CONFLICT OF LAWS 86
(2d ed. 1951). See also GOODRICH, CONFLICT Op LAWS 214 (3d ed. 1949).
58. 326 U.S. 310 (1945), 6 LOUISIANA LAW REVIE:W 726 (1946).
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aware of all that could follow such a finding and have under-
standably required, that a corporation have substantial contacts
with the state before holding that the corporation. is "doing
business."'
Act .21 of. 1950, however, does not extend the legislative
control of' .the .state; its only effect, is to make corporations
'engaged in business activities" in the state amenable to suit'in
Louisiana cour.ts.on actions arising out of these business activities.
Since -a finding that a' foreign corporation is, encompa'ssed by t e
act'has no relation to the corporation's being subjected to taxa-
tion or legislative control, the couyrts may justifiably aclopta less
cautious att itude in their interpretation of "engaged in business
activities" within the state than they have shown in their con-
struction of. the term "doing business."
It would seem that the purpose of the legislature in avoiding
the use of the term "doing business" was to show clearly that this
extension of judicial jurisdiction involves no extension of legis-
lative control. It would also seem that the legislature, by adopting
a new term, manifested an intent that the jurisprudence constru-
ingthe term "doing business" should not bind the courts' treat-
ment of the term "engaged, in business3 activities in the state."
It is to be emphasized -that the 1950 statute. only extended
Louisiana's jurisdiction for service of process. Any extension of
tax jurisdiction must depend upon the language in. the statute
levying the tax, which in turn must meet the jurisdictional
requirements of the Federal Constitution.
It is submitted that the abandonment of "doing business" as
the jurisdictional basis 'for suits against foreign corporations
should be well received. Jurisdiction for purposes of service of
process based on the idea of "doing business" often becomes
confused with jurisdiction to tax and jurisdiction to regulate
based on the same abstract concept. The provision in our 1950
statutes is in accord with a dualtrend in jurisdictional decisions:
in defining the court with jurisdiction, a trend .from the court
with immediate .power over the defendant to the court where both
parties may most conveniently settle their dispute; and, in defin-
ing due process of lawa trend from emphasis on the territorial
limitations of courts to emphasis on providing notice and an
opportunity to be heard.59
59. Note, 16 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 523, 536 (1949).
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Constitutional Limitations on Suing Foreign Corporations in
Louisiana
When foreign corporations are subjected to local jurisdiction
through service on a person not authorized by them to receive
process, the possibility of violation of basic notions of jurisdic-
tional requirements may arise. In this area the Commerce Clause60
and the Due Process Clause6' of the Federal Constitution are the
two important safeguards for the non-resident defendant. In both
cases the United States Supreme Court is, of course, the final
arbiter as to when there has been an unconstitutional assertion
of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.
In Davis v; Farmers' Co-operative Equity Co. 62 the United
States Supreme Court held that a state may not exercise juris-
diction over a foreign corporation in a manner which imposes an
unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. The problem is
to determine what amounts to an undue or unreasonable burden
on interstate commerce. The present view seems to be that subjec-
tion of a foreign corporation to local jurisdiction through service
of process on an agent not designated by the corporation for that
specific purpose violates the Commerce Clause only when the
cause of action has no relationship to the forum state.6 3 Since the
Louisiana service of process provisions,, as interpreted by our
courts,64 do not authorize jurisdiction in, cases arising from a
foreign cause of action, the Commerce Clause limitation is bf little
practical importance to Louisiana.
The landmark case of Pennoyer v. Neff65 established the
principle that the Fourteenth Amendment requires that in order
for a state to assert personal jurisdiction over a non-resident,
minimum jurisdictional requirements must be present. It is well
settled that the doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neff applies not only to
60. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8.
61. U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV, § 1.
62. 262 U.S. 312 (1923).
63. The only time when service of process would be an undue burden
on interstate commerce is when the cause of action is not related to business
done at the forum state. See International Milling Co. v. Columbia Trans-
portation Co., 292 U.S. 511 (1934). There must be a very strong showing of
Inconvenience to the defendant. Denver and Rio Grande W.R.R. v. Terte,
284 U.S. 284 (1932), 32 COL. L. REv. 541. See also STUMBERO, CONFLICT OF LAWS
89 (2d ed. 1951). See especially cases collected in STUMBERG, id. at 89, n. 77.
64. See discussion of Staley-Wynne Oil Corp. v. Loring Oil Co., 182 La.
1007, 162 So. 756 (1935), page 628 supra. Service of process under La. Acts
1950, No. 21, p. 28, is limited-to-causes of action r
WAnsa in :ofsiana. See nt ur.asn~itoqbsns
-65. 95 U._71-4(1878). An excellent note on the doctrine of Pennoyer v.
Neff may be found in 94 L.Ed. 1167 (1950).
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individuals but also to personal judgments of state courts against
foreign corporations.6 If the foreign corporation has consented
to local jurisdiction, due process is satisfied.6 ' However, frequently
foreign corporations engage in activities in a state without
actually consenting to be sued. In this situation the Supreme
Court in its earlier decisions relied, as a test of the forum's power
to subject such corporations to suit therein, upon three factors
or jurisdictional requisites, which overlap to a great extent. The
Court attempted to ascertain whether, from all the facts involved
in a case, it could be inferred (1) that the corporation had
consented to suit (implied consent);6s (2) that the corporation
was present in the territory of the forum; 69 (3) that a foreign
corporation was "doing business" therein,70 and had thus sub-
mitted to the local jurisdiction,7'1 inferring therefrom consent to
be sued12 or presence in the forum state.7 3
The presence fiction, as well as the theory of implied con-
sent, were discarded in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, in
which Chief Justice Stone 'expressly repudiated them.7 4 In lieu
66. Riverside and Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189 (1915);
Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U.S. 518 (1895); St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350
(1882).
67. In re The Louisville Underwriters, 134 U.S. 488 (1890); Ex Parte
Schollenberger, 96 U.S. 369 (1877).
68. Old Wayne Mut. Life Asso. of Indianapolis v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8
(1907); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602 (1899); St.
Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882); Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404
(U.S. 1855).
69. See Louisville and N.R.R. v. Chatters, 279-U.S. 320 (1929); People's
Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco ,Co., 246 U.S. 79 (1918); International
Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914); St. Louis S.W. Ry. v.
Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1913); Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 205 U.S. 530
(1907).
70. See Washington ex rel. Bond & Goodwin & Tucker, Inc. v. Superior
Court of Washington for Spokane County, 289 U.S. 361 (1933); Riverside and
Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189 (1915); Mechanical Appliance
Co. v. Castleman, 215 U.S. 437 (1910); Commercial Mutual Accident Co. v.
Davis, 213 U.S. 245 (1909); Henrietta Mining and Milling Co. v. Johnson, 173
U.S. 221 (1899).
71. See Consolidated Textile Corp. v. Gregory, 289 U.S. 85 (1933); People's
Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79 (1918); St. Louis S.W. Ry.
v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1913).
72. See cases cited note 68 supra.
73. See cases cited note 69 supra.
74. Chief Justice Stone stated: "[Slome of the decisions holding the
corporation amenable to suit have been supported by resort to the legal
fiction that it has given its consent to service and suit, consent being implied
from its presence in the state through the acts of its authorized agents.
... But more realistically it may be said that those authorized acts were of
such a nature as to justify the fiction." 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945). In regard to
the presence theory, he said: "Since the corporate personality is a fiction,
...it is clear that unlike an individual its 'presence' without, as well as
within, the state of its origin can be manifested only by activities carried on
in its behalf by those who are authorized, to act for it. To say that the
corporation is so far 'present' there as to satisfy due process requirements,
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of the fictitious tests of implied consent and presence a new test
was laid down in the International Shoe case emphasizing that
the Due Process Clause requires that a foreign corporation have
certain minimum contacts with the' forum state such that the
maintenance of the suit is in accord with traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice, and that these demands of due
process are met by such contacts of the corporation with the
state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our
federal system of government, to require the corporation to de-
fend that particular suit.75
After the announcement of the International Shoe rule, there
was a great deal of conjecture as to how far it would be ex-
tended. This uncertainty has been at least partly dissipated by
Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corporation
Commission.76 In that case a mail order insurance company was
found to be subject to jurisdiction in Virginia although its only
contacts with the forum state were solicitations by its policy-
holders. The corporation maintained no office in Virginia, had no
agents there, and owned no property there. From this case it
would seem that the "contacts, ties and relations" of the Inter-
national Shoe rule might be small indeed and still meet the
requirements of "fair play and substantial justice. '77
It is submitted that all of the Louisiana service of process
law, which incorporates the 1950 act, is well within the "fair
play and substantial justice" rule of the United States Supreme
Court.78
for purposes of taxation or the maintenance of suits against it in the courts
of the state, is to beg the question to be decided. For the terms 'present'
or 'presence' are used merely to symbolize those activities of the corpora-
tion's agent within the state which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy
the demands of due process." Id. at 316.
75. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
76. 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
77. It may be readily seen that these "contacts, ties and relations" might
be small indeed to the corporate defendant, but very large and important to
a small plaintiff. See Note, The Growth of the International Shoe Doctrine,
16 U. OF CH. L. REV 523 (1949).
78. The applicable provisions of the Louisiana service of process law are
LA. R.S. § 13:3471(5)(a), (b), (c) and (d) (Supp. 1952). Paragraphs (a) and
(b) are based on express consent and present no serious problems. Paragraph
(c) is based on the concept of doing business, and the Louisiana interpreta-
tion of that concept does not even approach the constitutional limitations.
Paragraph (d) is predicated on the notion of "engaged in business activities
in this state," and as yet, has not been interpreted by the courts. However,
due to the language of the statute, it is limited to causes of action arising
out of business conducted in Louisiana., Therefore, it would seem difficult
to imagine a situation which arises out of the business done in Louisiana
where there would not be sufficient ties and contacts between the defendant




Under Louisiana law foreign corporations are amenable to
suit in all causes of action arising out of or connected wtih busi-
ness activities conducted by the corporation in Louisiana. The
Louisiana provisions are well within the constitutional limita-
tions set forth by the United States Supreme Court. The pres-
ently existing multiplicity of statutes and the conflict with rules
pertaining to domestic corporations, however, should be rem-
edied.79 It is submitted that all non-resident corporations engag-
ing in activities in Louisiana should be classified and treated as
two groups--(1) those corporations which do business here in
such a manner as to be required to register with the Secretary of
State; and (2) those foreign corporations which actually conduct
business activities in Louisiana, but not in a- manner so as to
require registration. The corporations falling into category (1)
should be treated as domestic corporations for all purposes in-
cluding jurisdiction, venue, taxation and statutory regulations.
For this first group, the concept of "doing business" as recognized
by our courts should serve as the criterion. In the second group
should be included those foreign corporations engaging in busi-
ness activities within this state whose contacts with Louisiana
are not sufficient to warrant subjection to general legislative con-
trol and taxation. They should, however, be amenable to suit in
our courts with regard to causes of action arising out of business
done within this state.
The interests of resident potential plaintiffs make it neces-
sary to subject foreign corporations to jurisdiction here and to
provide for service of process and venue statutes. By the addi-
•tion of the 1950 statute the courts are granted jurisdiction over
all causes of action and tax claims which arise out of business
transacted in this state. It is only fair and just that parties liti-
79. At the present four different paragraphs of LA. R.S. § 13:3471(5)
(Supp. 1952) relate to service of process against foreign corporations. One
has its jurisdictional basis in the concept of doing business which is found
in LA. R.S. § 12:202 (1950).
The venue provisions concerning foreign -and domestic corporations are
In a confused state. While it is not the purpose of the comment to deal with
venue provisions, it is to be noted that in suits against foreign corporations,
LA. R.S. §§ 13:3234-3235 (1950) give the plaintiff a liberal choice of venue
sites. As to venue provisions relating to suits against domestic corporations,
one is restricted to LA. R.S. § 12:37 (1950) and Arts. 162-165, LA. COos OF
PRACTICE of 1870. Thus one has more venue choice in suits against foreign
corporations than when suing a domestic corporation. This anomaly is due
to the broad repealing clause of La. Acts 1928, No. 250, p. 409. While this
result is probably due to inadvertence, it is the present law in Louisiana.
See Ramey v. Cudahy Packing Co., 200 So. 333 (La. App. 1941).
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gant be made amenable to suit in the state where the cause of
action arises. The "estimate of inconveniences" mentioned 1 y
the' lae&-Chief Justice Stone in the International Shoe case 0
allows Louisiana to go beyond its pre-1950 claims in asserting
judicial jurisdiction over foreign corporations.
A. B. Atkins, Jr.
Confessions in Louisiana Law
CONFESSIONS DEFINED AND DISTINGUISHED FROM ADMISSIONS
Confessions are one species of admissions.' Thus, a discussion
of the subject of confessions requires discussion of admissions.
Admissions are commonly defined as direct or implied state-
ments by a party to a judicial proceeding of facts material
to the issue which, together with proof of other facts, tend to
establish his guilt or liability.2 When made extra-judicially, as
is usually the case where the question of their admissibility
arises, admissions are received in evidence as a time-honored
exception to the hearsay rule.3 According to Professor Wigmore,
hearsay evidence is excluded primarily because the person whose
statements are offered as evidence would otherwise, in effect, be
permitted to testify beyond the reach of cross-examination.
4
This exclusionary principle would seem to have no application
if the extra-judicial statements were offered against the party
who, having made them, may on trial explain or qualify their
meaning. This is normally the situation when a party's admis-
sion is offered in evidence against him. For this reason, too, other
dangers of admitting hearsay evidence-for example, that the
declarant was not under oath 5 or was not confronting the party
80. 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945), using Judge Learned Hand's language in
Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930).1. 1 GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 346, § 213 (16th ed.
1899); TRACY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 241 (1952); 3 WIOMORE,
EVIDENCE 231, § 816 (3d ed. 1940).
2. UNDERHILL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 507-08, § 265
(4th ed. 1935); 2 WHARTON, EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 1081, § 645 (11th ed.
1935).
3. TRACY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 231 (1952); 4 WIOMORE,
EVIDENCE 2-6, § 1048. See also Morgan, Admissions as an Exception to the
Hearsay Rule, 30 YALE L.J. 355 (1921); Strahorn, A Reconsideration of the
Hearsay Rule and Admissions, 85 U. OF PA. L. REV. 484, 564 (1937).
4. 4 WIflsORE, EVIDENCE 3-4, § 1048; 5 id. at 27, § 1365.
5. TRACY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 218 (1952).
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